Even a cursory survey of national policies towards genetically-modified (GM) foods reveals a deep division between those states which adhere to the precautionary principle and those who follow a more permissive assumption-based approach. Here I will trace some developments in diplomacy, research, and popular activism to explain why the European Union by and large observes the precautionary principle today.

The “precautionary principle” was first stated explicitly as Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Development and the Environment. This Principle recommended a precautionary approach where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to the environment. Famously, it asserted that “a lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measure to prevent environmental degradation” (UNEP, 1992, Principle 15).

In the year 2000 the precautionary principle was incorporated into the Montreal Biosafety Protocol. Soon after, the European Commission declared that it merited the status of international law, the scope of which included food safety policy. Accordingly, it authorized the Codex Alimentarius Commission to develop labeling standards for genetically modified foods.

While it may seem obvious that public safety should prevail as a policy orientation, some argue that the precautionary principle tends to stifle techno-scientific progress by demanding impossibly high standards of proof. They assert that “the slight but non-zero risk associated with a product or process is far safer than the alternative of doing nothing” (Hathcock 2000). In their view the health-risks involved with novel foodstuffs are more difficult to discern than the markers connected with environmental degradation. In the natural environment, any presumed toxin can be detected with sufficiently sensitive apparatus. On the other hand, with novel foodstuffs a slight allergenic response experienced by a scattering of susceptible individuals may never come to the attention of the medical authorities.

These considerations point towards a more “pragmatic” assumption-based approach, which welcomes innovation until specific health issues are identified. Since morbidity it usually reversible, the risks posed by untested foodstuffs are insignificant in relation to the benefits promised by scientific advance. Not surprisingly, this point of view is championed by GM lobbyists and industry-friendly research organizations.

In 1998 these two approaches met with a clash that still reverberates at the highest levels of government. At the centre of the conflict was Dr. Árpád Pusztai, who was employed as a senior scientist at the Rowett Research Institute in Scotland. In 1995 the Scottish government awarded the Institute a three-year grant to establish a reliable protocol for future GMO risk assessments. With Dr. Pusztai as director, the project was to be the world’s first independent study on the safety of GM food.

Using standard procedures Pusztai and his associates fed laboratory rats a diet of Monsanto potatoes, genetically modified to express the Bt insecticide. Contrary to expectation, not only did the rats fail to thrive, but they also showed significantly smaller heart, liver and brain sizes, together with a diminished immune response, compared to a control group fed with non-GM potatoes. Alarmed by these findings, Pusztai aired his concerns via a TV interview, in which he said (in accordance with the precautionary principle) that “it is very, very unfair to use our fellow citizens as guinea pigs. We have to find guinea pigs in the laboratory.” He added that he himself would not eat GM potatoes until he had seen scientific evidence attesting to their harmlessness.

Within 48 hours Pusztai was relieved of his position and put under a gag order. His papers were seized and his team was dispersed (Engdahl 2007: 24). His employer went on record claiming that Pusztai had confused things by feeding the rats a diet of poisonous potatoes.

In February 1999, 30 scientists in 13 countries signed an open letter in support of Pusztai, and in the same month the UK Parliament invited the scientist to testify before it, effectively overriding Monsanto’s gag order. Pusztai’s testimony unleashed a wave of public revulsion right across Europe. Two months later all the major food processors agreed to remove GM ingredients from their European brands. Popular opposition continues strong to this day, even though the EU commission has since approved several GM varieties for human consumption.

Bibliography

Engdahl, William 2007. Seeds of Destruction: the Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation. Montreal: Global Research, Centre for Research on Globalization.

Ewen, Stanley and Pusztai, Arpad 1999. Effect of diets containing genetically modified potatoes expressing Galanthus nivalis lectin on rat small Intestine. The Lancet, 16 October.

Hathcock, John N. 2000. The Precautionary Principle — An Impossible Burden of Proof for New Products. AgBioForum 3(4).

Smith, Jeffrey M. 2007. Genetic roulette: the Documented Health risks of Genetically Engineered Foods. Fairfield, Iowa: Yes! Books.

United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 1992. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. http://www.unep.org/Documents/default.asp?DocumentID=78&Article!D=1163.